INTRODUCTION
A STRONG ARGUMENT FOR ELECTIONS is that society may be collectively better informed about the relative quality of a set of alternatives than any individual. Elections provide a mechanism for aggregating private information, ensuring a better collective decision. This idea inspired some of the earliest mathematical models of voting in elections and dates back at least to Condorcet.2 The set of environments in which elections might usefully aggregate private information about the relative quality of a pair of alternatives goes well beyond the jury setting that was the focus of Condorcet's work. In most elections voters have common values with respect to some characteristic of the alternatives and are privately informed about this characteristic. Consider the following examples:
(i) An election is held to decide whether or not to increase funding for a local public good. Voters have different valuations for the public good and are uncertain about the cost or the quality of the proposed plan. One particular example is referenda on school funding. While voters' willingness to spend money on schools differs, all agree that better student performance is preferable. There is uncertainty about the degree to which increased spending translates into student performance.
(ii) Voters must decide between an incumbent and a challenger. Voters' preferences have both a private and a common value component. The private 1 We wish to thank Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, Okan Yilankaya, the editor and three anonymous referees for helpful comments. Pesendorfer gratefully acknowledges support from NSF Grant SBR-9409180.
2 For a discussion of Condorcet's Jury Theorem and extensions see Ladha (1992) , Miller (1986) , and Young (1988) .
value component is voter preferences over the candidates' ideological positions.
A common value component is the "character" of the candidates. Candidates with good character can be relied upon to stick closely to their announced positions while those with poor character cannot. Risk averse voters all prefer a candidate with better character. Voters are differentially informed about the record of each candidate and therefore possess private information.3 (iii) Voters in Presidential primaries are concerned not only about the policy positions of the competing candidates but also about each competitor's probability of winning the general election. All the primary voters prefer any of the candidates running in the primary to any of the candidates from the other party. Voters possess private information about the candidates' electability. 4 The traditional approach to the question of how well elections aggregate information assumes that voters have identical preferences and behave "naively,"5 i.e., each voter behaves as if her choice alone determines the outcome. However, naive voting is not generally an equilibrium of the corresponding voting game.6 Voters face a decision problem that is similar to the problem facing bidders in a common value auction. In both elections and auctions an agent's action affects her payoff only in very particular circumstances. As is well known, bidders in a common value auction must condition their belief about the value of the object on the event that their bid is the highest. Similarly, voters must condition their beliefs about the quality of the alternatives on the event that one vote can change the election outcome, i.e., a vote is pivotal. The following example illustrates the problem.
A community must vote on a proposal to increase school funding. There are two equally likely states of the world: the proposal works (w) (e.g., it improves test scores, reduces dropout rates, etc.) or it does not (nw). Everyone in the community favors the proposal in state w and is opposed otherwise. None of the voters knows the state of the world but each voter gets one of two signals: in state w every voter gets the signal w with probability 0.6. In state nw every voter gets the signal nw with probability 0.6. The proposal passes if at least 2/3 vote in favor. Suppose all voters vote "naively," i.e., in favor if they receive signal w 3In the literature on macroeconomic performance and elections, competence is frequently introduced as a common value component of voter preferences. See, for example, Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1990) , Rogoff (1990) . 4 The fact that voters' decisions about which candidate to support are influenced by how they believe others assess the candidates is known as the "bandwagon effect": candidates who are seen winning early primaries gain support in later primaries (see, for example, Bartels (1988) ). The bandwagon effect is often thought to be a feature of preferences: voters like to support winning candidates just as sports fans enjoy rooting for winning teams. In contrast, we are suggesting that the phenomenon is due to voters learning about the relative merits of the candidates. The bandwagon effect is prima facie evidence that electoral results reveal useful information to voters. 5See Ladha (1992) , Miller (1986) , and Young (1988) . See Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Myerson (1994b) , and Klevorick et al. (1984) for exceptions to the assumption of naive voting.
6Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1995) .
and opposed otherwise. Then in a large election, whenever a vote is pivotal (i.e., 2/3 of the voters have voted for the proposal), the state is almost certainly w and everyone should vote in favor!7 As in the above example, we consider a population of voters that uses an election to choose one of two alternatives (labeled Q and A). In contrast to the above example, we allow voters to have different preferences over the two alternatives. Each voter's payoff depends on her preference type, on a state of nature, and on the winning alternative. Preference types are drawn independently from a given distribution whereas the state of nature is common for all voters. Voters know their own preference types but are uncertain about the state of nature. Every voter receives a signal that provides information about the realization of the state of nature. Voting is costless and voters can either vote for Q or for A. Alternative Q wins if the fraction of voters voting for it is at least q. We analyze the voting equilibria of this game (symmetric Nash equilibria in which voters do not use weakly dominated strategies).
In a voting equilibrium preference types can be divided into three groups: those types who always vote for Q, those who always vote for A, and those who change their vote depending on their private signal. We say the latter types take informative action.
Our first three results analyze voting behavior and information aggregation in relatively simple environments in which voters are uncertain about a one-dimensional state variable.
Theorem 1 demonstrates the inherent tension between information aggregation and informative voting. We show that the fraction of voters who take informative action goes to zero as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. The result that almost no voters take informative action in large elections would seem to put into grave doubt the supposed utility of elections as information aggregation devices. Our next two results show that this is not the case.
Theorem 2 shows that for a wide variety of preference distributions large elections are almost always very close. Theorem 3 shows that elections satisfy full information equivalence: with probability arbitrarily close to one, the alternative that would have been chosen if all the private information were common knowledge is selected. This result may appear paradoxical in light of our first result. While the fraction of the electorate's signals revealed in equilibrium goes to zero, the number of voters who reveal their signal goes to infinity so that in the limit all information is revealed. Theorem 2 guarantees that the election will be decided by those taking informative action, and thus, large elections effectively aggregate private information.
7 It should be clear that this example does not depend on the fact that we chose a 2/3 rule rather than simple majority rule. It could easily be modified to show that naive voting is generally not a best response to a population voting naively also in the case of simple majority rule.
We use a series of examples to illustrate the effect of relaxing our key assumptions. We also illustrate in Section 5.1 that, in contrast to strategic voting, naive voting typically fails to lead to full information equivalence.
Our last result examines the implications of more complicated information environments. We demonstrate that if there is additional uncertainty about the distribution of preferences, then elections will generally not satisfy full information equivalence and the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero. The degree to which the election fails to meet the full information equivalence requirement is parameterized by the level of uncertainty about the distribution of preferences. When this uncertainty is small, the election mechanism almost satisfies full information equivalence.
Our approach is related in some respects to the approach taken by Lohmann (1993) and Austen-Smith (1990). Lohmann uses a similar framework to analyze the effects of private information on costly participation in political protest movements while Austen-Smith examines the incentives for strategic voting in small two-alternative elections. Neither Lohmann nor Austen-Smith considered the asymptotic properties of their models. Our results are also related to the literature on information aggregation in auctions: Milgrom (1979) , Wilson (1977) , and Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1995). In another related paper Palfrey (1985) analyzes information aggregation in a Cournot model.
THE MODEL
We analyze a two alternative election. Alternatives are denoted by j E {Q, A}.
There are n + 1 voters indexed by i E {1,..., n + 11. A voter's utility depends on a preference parameter x E [-1, 1] = X, the chosen alternative j, and the state s E [0, 1]. We denote by u(j, s, x) the utility function of voters. Let denote the utility difference of a voter type x between alternative A and alternative Q in state s. Each voter knows her preference type but is uncertain about the realization of the state. By G(s) we denote the probability distribution that describes the prior beliefs about the state s. Each voter receives a signal 0r EC {1, . .. , M} -X from an information service k E {1,..., K}. We assume that conditional on state s being realized, the signal that voter i receives is independent of the signal that voter j receives. Thus we can define the function Pk(U Is) which denotes the probability that a voter receives signal o-if s E [0,1] is realized and the voter is served by information service k.
A voter's type is characterized by a preference parameter and an information service. Let T [-1,1] x {i, ..., K} denote the type space. Let F be a probability distribution over T, where F(x, k) denotes the probability that the type is in the set [-1, x] x k. Let Fx(x) = EK 1 F(x, k). The assumption of K information services allows us to introduce correlation between access to information services and preference types. Nature selects the electorate by choosing n + 1 voter types independently according to the probability distribution F. Each voter knows her own type but is uncertain about the other voters' types. The distribution F is common knowledge.
A voter can choose Q or A. Let 0 < q < 1 be a fixed parameter. If the number of voters who choose Q is larger than or equal to (n + 1) q, then Q is the outcome. Otherwise, A is the outcome.
We make the following assumptions: is bounded above and below. Assumption 3 implies that every preference type is in the support of Fx.
Assumption 4 says that the signal satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP). One implication is that for s' > s, Pk(. I S') first order stochastically dominates Pk(-I S) (Witt (1980)).8 In addition, a higher signal indicates to the voter that a higher state should be expected for any prior. More precisely, for a' > o-the distribution over states conditional on cr' first order stochastically dominates the probability distribution over states conditional on o- (Milgrom (1981) The final part of Proposition 1 now follows since Pk( I S') first order stochastically dominates Pk( I S) for s' > s and F(x4k, k) is nonincreasing in cr.
VOTING EQUILIBRIA IN LARGE ELECTIONS
In this section we analyze the limiting properties of a sequence of elections with n voters, where n -* oo. Along any such sequence only the number of voters changes while the information structure, the payoffs, and all other parameters stay fixed. In the following we superscript our notation with n to indicate that we are working with elements of a sequence. We assume that for each element of the sequence qn is an integer (Assumption 6). As before, this assumption is made for convenience only.
Large Elections and Informative Action
In this section we show that informative action by the electorate creates an incentive for individual voters not to vote informatively. This leads to the central result in this section: in a voting equilibrium with a large number of voters only a vanishing fraction of the electorate takes informative action.
We assume that the probability of receiving signal o-in state s is a continuous function of s.
ASSUMPTION 7: Pk(o-I s) is continuous in s for all k and for all o-.
Assumption 7 implies that for any symmetric strategy profile, 7T t(s, 7T) iS continuous. For the remainder of the paper we will assume that Assumption 7 holds. In Example 2 we demonstrate how the following results (in particular Theorem 1) fail if Assumption 7 is violated.
As we argued above, voters must evaluate candidates in the event a vote is pivotal. In the following we characterize the probability distribution over states conditional on the event that a vote is pivotal. We define S f7l ) as the set of states for which the expected vote share of alternative Q is within 'q of the vote share of the state that minimizes It(s, tf) -qI. More precisely, simply denotes the set of states for which the expected vote share of alternative Q is within 'q of q. Lemma 1 demonstrates that for large n, conditional on a vote being pivotal, the probability distribution over states must be concentrated on those states which generate an expected vote share closest to q. In Lemma 2 we assume that the expected fraction of voters who receive their signal from service k and vote informatively is bounded away from zero. We demonstrate that this implies that information service k is asymptotically redundant. I s')) between s and s'. Since the decrease in the expected vote share must be less than 2ij, it follows that pk(1 Is) -pk( Is') must be less than 2-j/8 which establishes the Lemma.
In Lemma 3 we consider a sequence of voting equilibria that have the property that information service k is asymptotically redundant. Under this hypothesis we show that the strategy of voters who receive their information from service k is almost independent of the signal they receive. More precisely, we show that X4' xkn -0.
LEMMA 3: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Consider a sequence of voting equilibria T* n) and assume that information service k is asymptotically redundant. Then, the cutpoints corresponding to T * satisfy X 'n --0.> o.
PROOF: See Appendix.
To get an intuition for Lemma 3, observe that by the definition of asymptotic redundance, we find a sequence of subsets of states with the property that Pr(s E S' Ipiv, -7i) -> 1 and that the signals from service k discriminate very little between the states in S' if E is small. Therefore, the expected payoff difference between voting for Q and A, conditional on a vote being pivotal, is almost independent of the signal from service k. By Assumption 1, v(x, s) is strictly increasing in x at a rate larger than K. As a consequence, there is at most a small interval of preference types x with the feature that the voter prefers alternative Q for one signal and alternative A for another signal. Therefore, the range of preference parameters for which a voter takes informative action must be small if E is small, and the Lemma follows.
Theorem 1 says that the expected fraction of voters who take informative action in equilibrium must converge to zero. Furthermore, because every preference type is served by some information service (Assumption 3), the cutpoints of at least one information service must converge. The proof of Theorem 1 is straightforward. Suppose, contrary to Theorem 1, that the expected fraction of voters who receive their information from service k and take informative action is bounded away from zero. Then, Lemma 2 implies that k is asymptotically redundant and so Lemma 3 implies that the cutpoints for service k must converge. But then the expected fraction of voters who receive their information from service k and take informative action converges to zero, establishing a contradiction. PROOF: By Proposition 1, in any voting equilibrium the cutpoints are ordered for all k, and hence, the first hypothesis of Lemma 3 is satisfied. Also note that F does not have any mass points. Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that in any voting equilibrium F(x( j, k) -F(xm n, k) -> 0. This follows since by Lemma 2, if F(Xk, n, k) -F(xk, n k) stays bounded away from zero along some subsequence, then information service k is asymptotically redundant. Lemma 3 then implies that Xk,n'l 4n -_ X0 which in turn implies that F(Xk, n k) -F(xk, n k) -O0, resulting in a contradiction.
To prove the final part of Theorem 1 let X*n satisfy E(v(x*n, s) Ipiv) = 0.
Note that Xk,' <X*f <Xk4' for all k. By Assumption 3 there is a k' such that f(x*n, k ) ? a/K. We will show that x' -k'nxk n-O. Suppose x4 'n-Xk ,n2> > 0 for all n. Continuity of f(, k') then implies that F(Xk" , k ') -F(xk', n k') 2 iq > 0 for some i > 0 which yields the desired contradiction. Q.E.D.
Voting Behavior and Full Information Equivalence
In this section we show the following results: Theorem 2 demonstrates that in equilibrium large elections must be very close, i.e., the fraction of the electorate that supports alternative Q must be very close to the critical fraction q.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that elections effectively aggregate information. More precisely, we show that large elections almost always choose the alternative that would have been chosen if the state variable were common knowledge. In order to show these results, we require two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 4 provides the converse of Lemma 3. It says that if the cutpoints of an information service converge, then the information service must be asymptotically redundant. As an intuition, observe that if the cutpoints for information service k converge to one point, it must be that the expected utility difference between the alternatives, conditional on a vote being pivotal, changes very little as the voter's signal changes. This can only be the case if the signal adds very little information once a voter conditions on being pivotal. Hence, information service k is redundant.
The following results use the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (SMLRP). The SMLRP implies that sampling many signals from any information service makes it possible to determine the state with great accuracy. To get an intuition for Lemma 5, recall that by Lemma 4 at least one information service k must be asymptotically redundant. Thus, for every E > 0 we find a sequence S with the property that (1) fs f3(s Ipiv 7T*) ds -1 and (2) the probability of receiving any signal from service k varies by less than E on S'. If Assumption 8 holds, then every information service discriminates between every pair of states. Therefore, (2) can only hold if the maximum distance between any pair of states in S' is small. Hence, the probability distribution over states, conditional on a vote being pivotal, must be arbitrarily concentrated around one state for n large enough. Since Sn maximizes the probability that a vote is pivotal, it follows that the conditional probability distribution must be concentrated around Sn.
Theorem 2 says that in large elections the expected vote share of alternative Q will be very close to q. Let XQ denote the preference type who is indifferent between Q and A in state s = 1 and let XA denote the preference type who is indifferent between A and Q in state s = 0. Then, by the assumption that voters never play weakly dominated strategies in a voting equilibrium, all preference types below XQ always vote for Q, and all types above XA always vote for A. Therefore, if 7*f is a sequence of voting equilibria, then Fx(XA) ? tn(s, 7T*n) > Fx(xQ). In a large election the actual vote shares are close to the expected vote shares with high probability. Theorem 2 therefore implies that large elections will be close with probability close to one in every state. Note that Theorem 2 holds for a wide variety of preference distributions.
To give an intuition for Theorem 2, suppose there is a state such that the expected vote share of Q is less than q --q for all n. By Theorem 1 vote shares change very little as a function of s if the electorate is large. Therefore, for large enough n, the vote share of Q is less than q -r/2 for all states. Since the expected vote share of Q is decreasing in s (Proposition 1), it must be that s = 0 minimizes the difference between the expected vote share and q. But then (by Lemma 5), conditional on a vote being pivotal, the state is close to 0 with probability close to one. Since the fraction of voters who prefer Q in state s = 0 is larger than q by assumption, the expected vote share of Q must be larger than q. This establishes the desired contradiction. expected q-median. In an election in which the state is known, the actual q-median's preferred alternative wins. In a large election the actual q-median's preference parameter is very close to x* with probability close to one. Therefore, full information equivalence is satisfied in a large election if the expected q-median's preferred alternative wins with probability close to one.
Clearly, the alternative preferred by the expected q-median depends on the state. Let We now formally define full information equivalence as follows: DEFINITION 3: We say that a sequence of strategy profiles satisfies full information equivalence if for all e > 0, there is an n such that for n' > n, the following holds: if s < s* -E then Q is elected with probability greater than 1 -E; if s > s* + E then A is elected with probability greater than 1 -E.
We now prove that full information equivalence holds for any sequence of voting equilibria. To give an intuition, consider the case in which there is a state that makes the expected q-median voter indifferent between the two alternatives, i.e., v(x*, s*) = 0. Lemma 5 implies that, conditional on a vote being pivotal, the distribution over states puts almost all the weight on the neighborhood of one state Sn . Thus, voters essentially behave as if state S n has occurred. First we show that lim Sn = s*. To see this, note that if, e.g., V(x*, Sn) > E > 0, then the fraction of voters who prefer Q in state Sn is smaller than and bounded away from q. But then, the fraction of voters who vote for Q must be smaller than and bounded away from q, which contradicts Theorem 2. From Lemma 5 we know that the election is tied only if the state is very close to s*. Since the vote share of alternative Q is strictly decreasing in s, this can only be the case if for s < s* -E alternative Q wins with probability close to one, and for s > s* + E alternative A wins with probability close to one. PROOF: Case 1-If Fx(xQ) > q, then since all voters with x < XQ will vote for Q, alternative Q will be chosen with probability close to one for large n. It remains to be shown that for large n whenever s > s* + E, the probability that A is chosen is larger than 1 -E, and whenever s < s* -E, the probability that A is chosen is smaller than E. Let w(m I s, 7*n) denote the probability that (1 -t(s*, *n))n -qn < E for n sufficiently large. And hence for all s > s* + E, E w(mIs,*n)<<E E w(mIs*, *n)?<E.
m>qn m>qn
This implies that A will be chosen with probability larger than 1 -e. An analogous argument shows that for s < s* -E the probability that A is chosen is smaller than E. Q.E.D.
EXAMPLES
For the following examples we assume that 
Example 2
In this example we demonstrate how a failure of Assumption 7 (continuity of Pk( I s)) may lead to a voting equilibrium in which the fraction of voters who take informative action does not converge to zero, and hence, Theorems 1 and 2 do not hold. However, voting equilibria still satisfy full information equivalence.
Suppose that g(s) = 1, q = 1/2, and there is one information service that is described by 11-or if s>1/2, where a < 1/2. The unique voting equilibrium is given by the cutpoints x1 = 1/4 -a/2 and x2 = -1/4 + a/2. The equilibrium strategies in this example are independent of n.
11 The model setup used in this example is nearly identical to the setup used in Lohmann (1993) with the key differences that we assume no costs to participate and uncertainty about the location of voter ideal points. To see why the prescribed strategies are an equilibrium, note that It(s, ITf) -ql = 1(2 a -1)2 for every s, and therefore, conditioning on the event that a vote is pivotal provides no information. As a consequence, the signal is informative, conditional on a vote being pivotal, and private information remains valuable for all n.
Example 3
We now give an example that demonstrates how Theorem 3 depends on the SMLRP. What is critical in this example is that voters with preference types around the expected q-median voter do not have access to an information service that discriminates between states as precisely as voters on the extremes. and -1 +2x+2E(sIpiv,,2,1)>0 for x> 1/6. Therefore, irrespective of the state, each alternative has a 50% chance of winning the election and full information equivalence is not satisfied.
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTION OF VOTERS' PREFERENCES
Up to now we have assumed that voters know the distribution from which preferences are drawn. In this section, we show how introducing uncertainty about this distribution upsets the results. To simplify the analysis we assume that voters are uncertain about the expected fraction of partisans, i.e., voters who choose either alternative Q or alternative A irrespective of the state. Let F be a probability distribution that satisfies Assumption 3. In this section we assume that the distribution function according to which nature selects the electorate depends on the parameter A E [0, 1] and is given by choosing the state (s, A) , nature selects an electorate by taking n independent draws from the distribution HA.13 For the remainder of this section we assume that Assumptions 1, 2, 4-8 hold and that there is one information service described by p(cr I s). It is straightforward to verify that, in this modified environment, Proposition 1 still holds.14 Thus, there exists a voting equilibrium, and every voting equilibrium can be described by ordered cutpoints. Let (13) x(A) = HA 1 (q)
denote the expected q-median voter if A is realized. Further, let s(A) be such that v(s(A), x(A)) = 0. Thus, s(A) is the state at which the expected q-median voter is indifferent between the two alternatives if A is realized. Note that (12) implies that s(A) is well-defined. Moreover, s(A) is a strictly decreasing function of A.
A sequence of voting equilibria, therefore, satisfies full information equivalence if for all e > 0, there is an n such that if n' > n then the following holds for every A: if s < s(A) -E, then Q is elected with probability greater than 1 -e; if s > s(A) + E, then A is elected with probability greater than 1 -E.
The first part of Theorem 4 says that the set of voters who use their private signal o-stays bounded away from zero in measure when the distribution of the electorate is uncertain. The second part says that full information equivalence does not hold. This latter result will be shown to hold for a typical utility function v(x, s). To make this precise, denote the set of utility functions that satisfy Assumption 1 by P. Endow P with the topology of uniform convergence. We say that a property holds for a generic To any KM-tuple a = (all,...,alM,...,aKl ....aKM), let fr(a) be the (unique) set of cutpoints associated with the best responses to the strategy characterized by the cutpoints (ak,). Note that substituting the cutpoints into Equation (6) Thus it follows that sup S', -inf S', <,E, and hence, the probability distribution over states s E [0,1] must converge to a probability distribution that has all its mass concentrated at some Sn.
First we show that E < sn < 1 -E for some E > 0. To see this suppose, for example, sn -0. For large n, (12) implies that the fraction of voters who prefer Q at s = 0 is larger than q + 71, for some -1 > 0. Therefore, the vote share of q must be larger than q + -q/2 for large n for all A and all s. But this in turn implies that s = 1 is the state for which voters are most likely to be pivotal, which contradicts Sn -O 0. Given the equilibrium cutpoints xn, let (v(s, x) -v(s -E, x) ). Since v is (uniformly) continuous, it follows that for every 8 > 0 there is an E > 0 such that if Its' -sIt < E, then we can find a v' that generates s' with the property that lIv' -vll < 8, and hence, 0 is dense in P.
To prove the claim, consider points (A1,..., AM+ ) and let 0 < A1 < A2 < *-< AM++, < 1, and let Part (iii): Let s* be as in Theorem 3 (i.e., corresponding to 4 = 0) and suppose that part (iii) of the Theorem does not hold. Then there must exist an E > 0 and a sequence (n, on) with n -x oo, -0 and (i) for s < s* -E alternative A is elected with probability greater than E or (ii) for s > s* + E alternative Q is elected with probability greater than E for all n.
We will derive a contradiction. The proof repeats arguments given above and is therefore only sketched. First, we can use the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1 to demonstrate that Ixn,4n-x4-I -*0. (As before we can show that if Ix n,--xn4nI> v>0 for all n, then the information service is asymptotically redundant. The argument is a slight modification of the argument given in Lemma 2, and, therefore, omitted. Lemma 3 demonstrates that asymptotic redundance of an information service implies that the cutpoints converge. This Lemma can be applied without modification, and hence, we demonstrated that cutpoints converge.) As in the proof of part (i), cutpoint convergence implies that the beliefs conditional on a vote being pivotal must converge to a point mass. I.e., there is a sequence of states sn such that for every 8 > 0, Pr(Is -sSnl> 8 Ipiv, l)-> 1. But then, by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 2, the probability that any given voter votes for Q must converge to q. Repeating the argument of Theorem 3, this implies that sn -* s* and that we can choose 8 > 0 such that for s < s* -E, Q is elected with probability larger than 1 -E whereas for s >s -E, A is elected with probability greater than 1 -E which contradicts our initial hypothesis.
Q.E.D.
